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April 30, 1976, marked the first anniversary 
of the end of the Vietnam war. But it cannot be 
said that serious analysis of the meaning of 
this event has yet gone very far. Stereotypes 
such as “world-shaking victory of the national 
libe ra tion  m ovem ent” and ‘ dangerous 
advance of the forces of communism in South­
east Asia” amount not to analysis but to little 
more than special political pleading by those 
who supported one side or the other in the 
conflict.
One of the most interesting observations on 
the matter that I have seen was actually made 
in 1969, well before the end of the war and 
about two years before his own death, by the 
veteran Hungarian marxist George Lukacs. 
Lukacs said: “The defeat of the USA in the 
Vietnam war is to the ‘American way of life ’ 
rather like what the Lisbon earthquake was to 
French feudalism.”
Michael Lowy expands on Lukac’s comment 
in an article in New Left Review (No. 91, May- 
June 1975): “The Lisbon earthquake of 1755 
triggered off an extraordinary ideological 
crisis in Europe, particularly in France. The 
deadly and absurd event (total destruction of 
the city and 20,000 deaths) challenged 
Leibniz’s optim istic (and conformist) ideology
We live in the best of all possible worlds’, 
Alexander Pope’s ‘What is, is right’, as well as 
the whole concept of divine Providence. 
Voltaire made his Doctor Pangloss, the 
philosopher of smug optimism, die in the 
Lisbon earthquake. Thus, fo r Lukacs, the 
consequence of the Vietnam war was, by 
analogy, as follows. Firstly, the end of 
optim istic illusions in an ‘era of peace’ on a 
world scale - illusions which he himself had 
harbored since 1956. Secondly, the decline of 
what he called ‘cybernetic relig ion’: blind faith 
in machines, computers and electronic 
instruments, omnipotent and provident 
fetishes, substitutes for the God of the 
eighteenth century, which were all defeated by 
the NLF. Last, and above all, the appearance of 
an enormous crisis of values, a radical 
challenge to imperialist ideology, which could, 
in future, erupt in a massive revolutionary 
upsurge of international dimensions.”
It is still far too early to estimate how 
accurate Lukacs’ prophecy w ill prove. As 
Lukacs himself recalled, Lisbon was destroyed 
in 1755 and the Bastille not until 1789. But 
signs of the depth of the changes wrought in 
American attitudes by the experience of the 
Indochina war are plain to see even at this
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early stage. The most obvious one is the 
effective paralysis of recent US interventionist 
attempts in Angola. The Angolan liberation 
forces thus owe as direct and immediate a debt 
to the Vietnamese revolution as those of 
Algeria did in 1954: Vietnam’s victory over 
French colonial power at Dien Bien Phu in May 
of that year was the direct detonator of the 
A lg e r ia n s ’ e ig h t -y e a r  s tru g g le  fo r  
independence from France which began less 
than six months later, on November 1.
*★*
The first anniversary of the end of the war is 
a good opportunity to examine, with the 
hindsight of the intervening months, the 
nature of the process by which Vietnam’s epic 
struggle was finally brought to an end.
While the media in the West concentrated 
almost exclusively on the role of North 
Vietnamese regular armed forges in the 
process, the Vietnamese media on the 
revolutionary side described it as one of 
“armed attacks and people’s uprisings” .
The Western formula is clearly inadequate, a 
somewhat pathetic survival of mid-sixties' 
S ta te  D e p a rtm e n t th in k in g .  B u t the  
Vietnamese formula, to my mind, is not all that 
much better. Both completely fail to capture 
the complex and largely unforeseen interplay 
of political and m ilitary factors which actually 
took place, and determined the outcome of the 
conflict.
Certainly, military action played a decisive 
role. Moreover, it was m ilitary action at the 
highest level of regular warfare ever attained 
by the revolutionary armed forces in Vietnam. 
The bombing on April 28 of Saigon’s Tan Son
Nhut airport by revolutionary pilots flying 
captured US A-37 bombers was highly 
symbolic in this respect: it was the first and 
only instance of the use of concerted aerial 
bombardment by their side in the whole war. 
The closing moments of the war were, 
therefore, a striking confirmation of the three- 
stage strategy of people’s war espoused by the 
Vietnamese since the days of the war against 
the French: from guerrilla, through mobile, to 
regular warfare.
General Vo Nguyen Giap and his deputy, 
General Van Tien Dung (p ronounced  
"Zoong” ), are the joint authors of a lengthy 
analysis of the “ Ho Chi Minh Campaign” which 
brought the war to an end. Published in Hanoi 
on July 7, 1975, their account attributed 
victory to “speedy tactical movement” 
(expressed elsewhere, more philosophically, 
as “effective use of time and space in 
warfare” ), and the "classic m ilitary siege".
On the first aspect they say that one of the 
keys to victory was “good preparation of rear 
areas and transportation” . Here they note a 
feature of the Ho Chi Minh Campaign which, 
like the Tan Son Nhut raid, was an entirely new 
thing in the practice of the Vietnamese 
revolutionary army, and contributed greatly to 
the quick success of the Campaign: “ Troops 
rode to battle in trucks and thus were able to 
move quickly to new battlefields when the 
opportunities were present.” The aspect of 
“classic military siege” related especially to 
the tactics employed in the capture of Saigon, 
Vietnam’s largest city, intact.
They said: "After our big victory in the 
highlands (the “strategic withdrawal” of the 
Thieu army from that region in mid-March 
which, incidentally, was described by the
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Voice of America at the time as “a wise 
strategic decision” - VoA March 20, 1975 - 
M.S.), the party quickly recognised, the the 
new situation and the new opportunity, and 
immediately advocated the carrying out of the 
anticipated plan - an all-out drive to capture 
Saigon. We made the correct assessment: the 
enemy was facing the danger of complete 
disintegration and our capabilities of winning 
final victory had rapidly matured. Each day the 
revolution in our country was making 
advances such as took 20 years in the past."
As the North Vietnamese troops continued 
to rout Saigon forces, the possibility of 
American intervention was weighed again by 
the m ilitary and political leaders. Giap and 
Dung say: “ Our party asserted that even if the 
United States dared to take part in the war 
again, we would determinedly advance to win 
because we had all the conditions to secure 
final victory."
The two generals said victory was hastened 
by poor American and Saigon intelligence. 
They go so far as to say that if the Americans 
had not made wrong calculations, "they might 
have had two more years in South Vietnam” . “ It 
was because of their poor intelligence that 
they were taken completely by surprise when 
our general offensive started,” they say. They 
noted that in 20 of South Vietnam’s 44 
provinces, no heavy fighting was necessary for 
victory. (To keep this claim in Derspective I 
should recall that a senior Vietnamese army 
officer told me during a visit I made to Saigon 
in the first 10 days of last June that the 
revolutionary armed forces lost some 20,000 
men killed in the Ho Chi Minh Campaign, with 
four or five times that number wounded.)
It is perhaps only to be expected that the 
analysis by the generals dwells much more 
heavily on the m ilitary aspect of the process 
than on the political, even though they repeat 
often enough the ritual formula "armed attacks 
and people’s uprisings".
The role of “ people’s uprisings” in the 
process varied greatly in importance from 
place to place and from time to time. It was 
extremely important, for example, in one early 
stage of the process - the fall of the major 
highlands centre of Ban Me Thuot in early 
March. A correspondent of Agence France- 
Presse in Saigon at the time, Paul Leandri, 
highlighted in a despatch the insurrection by 
local montagnards (tribesmen of m inority
nationality) which touched off the events 
leading to  the fa ll of the c ity  to  the 
revolutionary forces. Incensed, the Thieu 
authorities, who maintained that only “ North 
Vietnamese invaders" were involved, called 
him to police headquarters and demanded to 
know the source of his information. His refusal 
to divulge it led to a series of fast-moving 
events culminating in his death from a Thieu 
police bullet in the police headquarters 
courtyard a few hours later.
But as the momentum of the advance of the 
revolutionary armed forces increased, the 
aspect of “ people’s uprisings” certainly 
diminished in importance. The “ people’s” 
political role became increasingly that of 
protecting economic installations and public 
utilities from the sabotage attempts of the 
fleeing Thieu troops.
This is not to deny the co n tin u in g  
importance of political factors in the process 
which led to victory for the revolutionary 
forces, even if it is to dispute whether these 
factors are adequately described by the 
expression “people’s uprisings” . Indeed, it is 
an interesting fact that the most important 
political element in the process of Vietnam’s 
victory is still, a year later, not widely 
acknowledged for what it was. It was not the 
uprising of the urban masses against the hated 
Thieu regim e to w hich  revo lu tio na ry  
romantics, and some others, had for years 
looked forward. It was the collapse of the 
morale of the Thieu army and administration, a 
phenomenon as intensely political in nature as 
the disintegration of the Napoleonic armies on 
their retreat from Moscow. This was the prime 
political factor in the rapid victory of the 
revolutionary armed forces. In the extract from 
their analysis quoted above the generals 
implicitly say as much when they emphasise 
(first factor) “the enemy was facing the danger 
of complete disintegration” and (second 
factor) “our capabilities of winning final 
victory had rapidly matured".
The war did not have to end in the way itd id. 
Counter-revolutionary armies have been 
defeated before in history w ithout the 
wholesale disintegration that overtook the 
Thieu army. Even if this army had had a Taiwan 
to flee to there is no indication that it would 
have been capable of doing so in anything like 
the order achieved by the Kuomintang forces 
in their flight in 1949. (Nor, incidentally, was it 
likely that, given the state of mind prevailing in
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the USatthetim e, it would, either at thetim e or 
subsequently, have enjoyed the protection of 
the Seventh Fleet.)
The manner in which the war ended in fact 
expressed certain peculiar features of the 
dynamics of the Vietnam conflict. Following 
the withdrawal of the US and other foreign 
forces from Vietnam in 1973 under the Paris 
Agreement, US Secretary of State Kissinger 
claimed that the war had now become a “civil 
war". The Vietnamese revolutionaries hotly 
denied this, pointing to the obvious facts of the 
continued US funding of the Saigon wareffort, 
the continued presence of US advisers 
alongside the Thieu forces, and so on. But, 
looked at purely from the angle of the 
nationality of the combatants, Kissinger’s 
claim was correct. This fact was to prove of 
heavy consequence.
The Vietnam wars, French and American, 
from the very beginning, insofar as they 
concerned V ietnam ese, have had the 
character of "intra-fam ilia l” wars. Throughout 
Vietnamese society, but especially among the 
country’s numerically small but highly 
influential French-trained elites, families were 
divided in their allegiances. It was not 
uncommon for brothers or cousins, due to 
similarities in theirtra in ing, to find themselves 
working as opposite numbers in the ruling 
machineries of Hanoi and Saigon. As well as 
d irec t fam ily  re la tionsh ips , there were 
thousands of cases in which members of the 
ruling groups at the two ends of the country 
were personally acquainted. I have often been 
regaled by Hanoi officials w ith stories about 
the former Saigon president and vice- 
president Nguyen Cao Ky, for example, whom 
they had known from his student days in 
Hanoi. Most such tales concerned student 
K y’s am orous adventures, and c lea rly  
reflected close personal knowledge. This is 
not to mention the other thousands of cases of 
people actually changing sides in the course 
of the Vietnam wars. Such people came to 
possess personal knowledge of leading 
Vietnamese figures in both Hanoi and Saigon.
One result of all this was that, particularly in 
the recent war, US personnel in Saigon had a 
nightmarish time worrying about who, among 
their Vietnamese “friends” , just might be a 
double agent. They worried with good cause, 
for Saigon was host to double agents in plenty.
I myself met one of them. He had worked for 
years, and was still working in June 1975, in
the Saigon bureau o f the m ajor US 
newsagency Associated Press.
But much more important was the fact that 
there was a degree of interpenetration - one is 
tempted to use the word symbiosis - of the two 
Vietnamese sides which probably has few 
parallels in the history of war.
The Hanoi publicist Nguyen Khac Vien 
expressed aspects of this phenomenon in an 
interview granted in July last year to an 
Algerian journalist from the magazine Jeune 
Afrique. The Algerian had just returned from a 
visit to Saigon. He said: “ In the towns the 
masses apparently took little part in their 
liberation, there was no insurrectionary 
situation in the towns.” Vien replied: “ In our 
time you should not picture the people’s 
movement like the marches and mass 
demonstrations of the 19th and early 20th 
centuries, mounting open attacks on the 
organs of power. The means of repression at 
the disposal of the fascist regimes are 
nowadays so great that one would only be 
co u rtin g  fu tile  massacres. It is the 
combination of armed struggle with political 
struggle that decides victory ... As much as the 
tanks and guns of the liberation forces it was 
the work of persuasion, agitation, education 
carried on for years by millions of people 
which brought about the disintegration of 
Thieu’s troops. What South Vietnamese had 
not a brother, a friend, a cousin, a classmate or 
a son in the puppet army or police? And even 
before the liberation forces launched their 
attacks this work of undermining had already 
been done by millions of people. The 
liberation tanks moved against units and 
garrisons that had already been thoroughly 
worked over politically ...”
A nother aspect of th is  “ s y m b io tic ” 
relationship between the two Vietnamese 
sides must be noted: they were never even 
remotely equal in terms of national moral and 
political authority. This fact too was well 
understood, even if only privately, by both 
sides. Thus, to an unusual degree in “civil 
war” , the eventual outcome of the struggle was 
known in advance, especially to the principal 
actors, on both sides.
Various foreign observers have commented 
on this aspect of Vietnamese politics. Writing 
in the French paper La Tribune des Nations as 
early as July 15, 1955, the journalist Claire 
Barsal achieved something of a classic of 
under-statement when she wrote of the then
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Saigon ruler Ngo Dinh Diem: “ Diem labors 
under a basic handicap in a country which he 
c la im s  to  be le a d in g  to  c o m p le te  
independence - that is, that he is not the man 
who conquered colonialism. That man was 
and is still, in the eyes of the people, Ho Chi 
Minh, the victor in the colonial w a r ..."
Three years before, Philippe Devillers, a 
man with close connections with the French 
colonial administration and police, had been 
much more damning in his book Histoire du 
Vietnam 1940-52. On the problem of what 
social support remained for the French in 
modern Vietnam, he said: “What was left then? 
The Catholics? Would it not be the ruination of 
Catholicism in Vietnam to compromise it 
again, as in the 19th century, with ‘foreign 
imperialism’? Then there remain only, to side 
with France, ‘nationalists of the piastre, 
ambition or revenge’, those w*-.o out of lust for 
gain or honors, out of anti-communist passion 
or simply to assuage some personal grudge, 
are prepared to make themselves auxiliaries of 
a policy opposed to the interests of their 
people and directed against the freedom of 
their country ..."
He went on: “There is not a shadow of doubt 
that Ho Chi Minh has retained the ear and the 
confidence of the Vietnamese people and that 
the great majority of the ‘men of worth ’ in 
Vietnam have rallied to his cause. If one man 
today can pretend to bring about ‘national 
unity’ in Vietnam, to take the helm of the 
country and bring it to harbor, it is certainly Ho 
Chi Minh. It is above all with him, and with his 
men, that the Vietnam of tomorrow will 
inevitably be built. Nothing lasting orgreat will 
be done in this country w ithout them or 
against them."
It is only with an awareness of this moral, 
political and psychological background that it 
is possible to understand the totality and 
speed of the collapse of the Thieu regime. For 
Vietnamese on botn sides of the conflict it was 
the moment of truth - a moment delayed for 
decades by brutal foreign interventions - but a 
moment all knew had to come.
When the last Saigon President, General 
Duong Van Minh, in his speech of welcome - 
and surrender - to representatives of the 
revolutionary armed forces in Saigon’s 
Independence Palace on April 30, 1975, said 
“ The revolution has triumphed” he used words 
w h ich  every mem ber of the Saigon 
governmental elite had known for years in his
heart of hearts would one day be uttered by 
one of them. It was just a matter of by whom - 
and when.
All this is not to deny the genuineness of the 
fear of "communism” that gripped much of the 
rank and file of Thieu’s army, and a part of the 
civilian population, in the closing days of the 
war. Macabre events such as the action of 
Saigon army so ld ie rs  c lin g in g  to  the 
undercarriage of planes taking off from Da 
Nang on March 29, 1975, only to drop within 
seconds to their deaths, are not to be 
forgotten. One thing they prove is that the 
billions of dollars of US taxpayers’ money 
spent on anti-communist “ psywar" operations 
in Vietnam were not spent entirely in vain. But 
such events have only the most marginal 
significance in the history of Vietnam. Perhaps 
more than anything else they show that in 
South Vietnam, as within the USA itself, it was 
the poorest, least known, least influential 
people who suffered most from  the war. 
Compare the differing fates of Richard Nixon 
on the one hand and 19-year-old Lance- 
Corporal Darwin Judge, a former carry-out 
boy at a supermarket in Marshalltown, Iowa, 
on the other. Nixon, the author of the 
December 1972 bombing of Hanoi and 
Haiphong and the arch-criminal of the 
Watergate affair, has been granted a full 
pardon by his hand-picked successor as 
President, and now lives in comfort at San 
Clemente, California. Lance-Corporal Judge 
became the last American to die in action in 
Vietnam - the 55,567th - at Tan Son Nhut 
airport on April 29,1975. Or compare the fates 
of the fear-crazed rank and file Thieu soldiers 
at Da Nang with that of Lieutenant-General 
Dang Van Quang, who had the remarkable 
distinction of being known as the most corrupt 
general in the whole Thieu army: he was lifted 
out of the US Embassy grounds by helicopter 
and flown to safety on April 29.
To close this examination of the process of 
Vietnam's victory it might be useful to recall 
this comment on the ultimate fu tility  of the 
French and US interventions in Vietnam by 
Jean Sainteny, the veteran French diplomat 
who negotiated with Ho Chi Minh following 
Vietnam’s August Revolution of 1945, and was 
the first French "delegate-general” in Hanoi 
following the Geneva Agreements of 1954.
Speaking in a Paris radio interview on May 5, 
1975, a week after the fall of Saigon, M. 
Sainteny declared:
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Mammoth signboard in Hue reads "Hanoi-Hue-Saigon" demonstrating the linking together o f the three 
major cities.
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"We are witnessing the birth of a power 
possessed of formidable weapons, the best 
infantry in the world, and heavy equipment of 
Soviet origin and American material which has 
been captu red . There w ill be a very 
exceptional power in South-east Asia.
“The recent events are the outcome of the 
dominant idea of Vietnamese policy fo r 30 
years - first of all independence, which has 
now been won, then reunification.
“ I believe that the French war in Indochina 
could have been avoided at the price of 
concessions w hich  may have seemed 
considerable then but are negligible in today’s 
context.”
He added (my emphasis): “ It is probable, if 
not certain, that things would be much as they 
are today, but we would have made the 
considerable saving of avoiding that war and 
the other that has followed it.”
A “considerable saving” indeed!
** +
With the euphoria of victory passed, “ the 
most important task now is to wipe out, to 
l iq u id a t e ,  th e  d e e p , in n u m e ra b le  
consequences of a powerful and brutal neo­
colonialist intervention” - so said Nguyen 
Khac Vien in the interview quoted above.
T h e  S o u th  V ie tn a m  P r o v is io n a l  
Revolutionary Government's Foreign Minister, 
Nguyen Thi Binh, for her part, told foreign 
correspondents in Moscow recently: "If you 
come back to Saigon now, you would realise 
that the atmosphere has completely changed. 
But, if you go deeper, a lot of things have to be 
done to change the life of the people there - to 
make radical change.
“ In South Vietnam now - in spite of the fact 
that the war has stopped, that there is no more 
American presence, that there are no more US 
bombs - the sequels of .the war are felt daily, 
hourly, and they are weighing heavily on our 
country. And the situation will last for a long 
time.”
She said that there were still three million 
unemployed; food shortages were still being 
exploited by speculators; despite all efforts, 
only 300,000 people had been resettled from 
the cities in the countryside and the false 
urbanisation created by the war remained a 
massive problem; the PRG was still grappling 
with the problems posed by tens of thousands
of orphans, of women who had been forced to 
live by prostitution, of beggars and of drug 
add ic ts ; the PRG’s pow er was secure 
throughout South Vietnam, although a small 
number of CIA-linked opposition elements 
had engaged in sabotage.
David Shipler, of the New York Times 
Moscow bureau, who was at the interview, 
noted: “ Mrs Binh spoke softly. She did not 
seem like a victor, but like someone sobered 
by a long battle, confronted now by a further, 
different struggle.” (Australian Financial 
Review, March 8, 1976.)
Awareness of this sombre background is the 
essential starting point fo r all thought and 
action about South Vietnam from now on.
More aid is certainly needed from  the United 
Nations and other agencies. But central to the 
whole problem is the responsibility of the 
United States to assist in overcoming the 
p ro b le m s  c re a te d  by its  y e a rs - lo n g  
intervention in Vietnam. This responsibility is 
clearly expressed in Chapter VIII, Article 21, of 
the Paris Agreement of 1973: “ In pursuance of 
its traditional policy, the United States will 
contribute to the healing of the wounds of war 
in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and 
throughout Indochina.” Yet the US has not 
spent one cent in this direction since the end of 
the war. On the contrary it has placed a 
vindictive embargo on all trade with the two 
Vietnam s. It is not o n ly  a m oral and 
humanitarian question, it is vital to the 
practical solution of South Vietnam’s major 
current problem, economic recovery: US- 
equipped factories left over from the former 
regime, and there are not a few of them, cannot 
be effectively operated w ithout a guaranteed 
supply of spare parts from the USA.
US Vice-President Rockefeller, when he 
came to Australia for his recent bicentennial 
visit, was surely reminded that Australians 
have forgotten neither Vietnam nor the 
continuing and undischarged responsibility of 
the US government to provide Vietnam with 
reconstruction aid.
As for our own Fraser Government, its 
intentions in this respect were made clear in a 
little-noticed passage in an interview granted 
by its Foreign Minister, Andrew Peacock, to 
Michael Richardson of the Sydney Morning 
Herald (February 2, 1976). Richardson asked 
Peacock “will civil aid programs to the 
countries of Indochina be continued at their
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present levels?" Peacock replied: “We will 
continue to provide aid to Vietnam and Laos.” 
The omission of any reference to “ present 
levels" in Peacock’s reply could not have been 
more eloquent. Clearly, at least some of the 
Indochina aid programs developed under the 
Whitlam Government are slated for the chop 
by the cold-blooded axemen of the Fraser 
administration. The Labor Opposition should 
be probing to find out which prog rams they are 
and how their scrapping is justified. In doing 
so, the Opposition should be using for all it is 
worth the reported fact (Australian Financial 
Review, March 12) that its own Foreign Affairs 
Department recently urged upon the Fraser 
Government “ the provision of economic aid to 
the new governments of Indochina in a 
generous way” (my emphasis).
By the time this article appears there will 
have been elections held (April 25,1976) fo ra  
single national assembly fo r the whole of 
Vietnam.
But we should be under no illusion - the 
process of Vietnam’s reunification is still in its 
very early stages.
There is simply no quick solution to the 
problems created by the different evolution of 
the two halves of Vietnam over the past 30 
years.
Just to take the political problem: there is a 
real difference between acceptance by South 
Vietnamese of the rule of the PRG, and a 
positive desire on their part for reunification 
with the North. North Vietnamese Premier 
Pham Van Dong alluded to this situation when 
he to ld  a g roup  o f v is itin g  overseas 
Vietnamese, in Hanoi for the 30th anniversary 
of the DRV last September: “ If we can convince 
50 per cent of the South Vietnamese that 
reunification is an urgent need, that’s good; if 
we can convince 60 per cent, that's better; if we 
can convince 70 per cent, that’s perfect.”
The problems involved in reunifying the two 
economies have been canvassed often 
enough. The report (Australian Financial 
Review, March 12) that the South will build a 
“five-tier economy - private, jo in t private- 
State, State, collective and individual” , and 
that this economic policy is held by the PRG as 
“a long-range one” , is only the most recent 
indication that the problems of economic 
reunification are so substantial as not to be
rushed.
But n o tw ith s tan d in g  all d iff ic u lt ie s , 
“Vietnam is One.” However long it takes to 
consummate reunification, it is certainly 
Vietnam’s wave of the future.
It is up to foreign friends of Vietnam to be 
aware of the difficulties, and to be as patient as 
the Vietnamese appear to be as they work for 
their resolution.
***
Whether it has two governments or one, 
Vietnam is now “ independent and free, free 
and independent forever” - to quote the words 
of Workers’ Party leader Le Duan at the Hanoi 
victory celebrations of May 15, 1975.
It seems fitting to close this article on the 
first anniversary of Vietnam’s victory by 
looking a little more closely at the concept of 
independence and how it is understood in that 
country.
Examining the reasons fo r the political 
success of the Vietnamese communists in his 
1954 study The Vietnamese N ation  - 
C o n trib u tio n  to  a H is to ry , the French 
historian, Jean Chesneaux, finds the most 
im p o r ta n t fa c to r  to  be “ th e ir  to ta l 
independence in relation to the various 
powers that have dominated the Vietnamese 
people at the various stages of their history: 
Japan, France, China.”
He goes on: "This amounts to saying that the 
leaders of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
find the secret of their strength within their 
co un try  itse lf, among the 20 m illio n  
Vietnamese themselves."
While the number of Vietnamese is now 
more like 45 million - despite everything their 
various foes have been able to do in the way of 
killing Vietnamese since 1954, the nation has 
succeeded in generating a continuous baby 
boom - Chesneaux's point is as valid today as it 
was 22 years ago.
The American scholar Frances FitzGerald 
wrote after her visit to North Vietnam in early 
1975: "The word ‘independence’ is the starting 
and finishing point for any ideological 
discussion in North Vietnam. Itcomes up most 
frequently in relation to the Chinese ... As the 
Vietnamese present the matter, independence 
comes first, and if there is a conflict the other 
imperatives, such as that of Socialist unity,
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must be reconciled with it, rather than vice 
versa. Independence is the only issue that the 
North Vietnamese can be said to be fanatical 
about ... Independence is, to be sure, a 
complicated notion in this day of global 
economics and global politics, and it is 
particularly complicated for small countries. 
But for the North Vietnamese it has at least one 
specific meaning, and that is the liberation of 
the South from American influence, and the 
unity of the whole country.” (The New Yorker, 
April 28, 1975.)
Ms FitzGerald’s article hit the streets in New 
York less than 48 hours before the first part of 
that twin goal was achieved on April 30. The 
world may now expect to see Vietnamese 
independence displayed more vigorously than 
ever before. After all, if they preserved their 
independence through all the excruciating 
years of the war, why should it not be affirmed 
more strongly now that victory has been won?
The first instance in which an independent 
Vietnamese position may be expected to 
impinge on world opinion is in relation to the 
Paracel and Spratly islands, which are claimed 
by both Vietnam and China. This issue is 
undoubtedly the most "neuralgic” of all 
Vietnam’s problems with its neighbors. The 
sudden Chinese seizure of the Paracels from 
the Thieu regime in January 1974 has not been 
forgotten or forgiven by the Vietnamese. Their 
tit-for-ta t action in seizing the Spratlys from 
Thieu control immediately after the fall of 
Saigon was an indication of how deadly 
serious they are on the issue. A North 
Vietnamese statement in January 1974 
appealed for negotiations on the problem, but 
began with the firm statement “ Preservation of 
its territorial integrity is a sacred cause for 
every people". Although it has never been 
publicly referred to by either side in the 
dispute, a struggle for control of offshore oil 
resources gives a special edge of bitterness to 
the Paracels-Spratlys issue.
Another major manifestation of Vietnamese 
in d e p e n d e n c e  w ill  be th e  c o u n t r y ’s 
progressively closer identification with the 
non-aligned movement and the Third World in 
general. Despite all their wartime dependence 
on socialist-country aid, the Vietnamese never 
saw themselves as fundamentally aligned. 
They take great - and sometimes, one 
suspects, faintly malicious - pleasure in 
recalling that the success of their revolution in
August 1945 predated by more than four years 
the success of the revolution in their great 
neighbor country to the north. They also have 
a vivid recollection of the fact that fo r the first 
five years of the life of the DRV their country 
was not only “ non-aligned” , it was absolutely 
on its own. It was not until their big Border 
Campaign of 1950 which swept French forces 
from the region of the irfron tierw ith  Chinathat 
they gained access to the friendly rear 
provided by China, the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe.
Vietnamese independence w ill also be 
displayed in a series of bold joint-venture 
agreements with foreign capitalist concerns as 
they get fully underway with their quest for 
new technologies. They have already made 
th e ir in ten tions  c lea r in th is  respect, 
explaining that they are seeking not just 
technologies that are more advanced than 
their own, but those that are the world ’s most 
advanced in each particular field of their 
interest. With such a perspective, they will 
obviously in many areas have to go beyond 
their traditional socialist-country sources of 
technological assistance.
The Vietnamese in developing such policies 
are certainly demonstrating a desire to 
distance themselves from the Sino-Soviet 
conflict, and to lessen the pressures to which 
they are subjected as a result of this conflict. 
But it would be wrong to think that this is their 
prime motivation. I personally doubt whether 
their current policies would have been very 
different if this conflict had never arisen.
As was said at the outset, it is still far too 
early to know whether Lukac’s prophecy of “a 
m ass ive  re v o lu t io n a ry  u p s u rg e  o f 
international dimensions” w ill come to pass as 
a result of the US defeat in Vietnam. Certainly 
no major post-Vietnam political development 
anywhere in the world has as yet put Lukac’s 
idea out of court. There are even signs of 
confirmation of it in Africa and, with all 
allowance made for the differences in 
conditions of the countries concerned, in 
Western Europe.
What can be said with confidence here and 
now is that independent Vietnam is set to do 
many things that will mock old conceptions of 
socialist/capitalist/non-aligned divisions. It is 
set to make in te res ting  and unique 
contributions to world political developments 
in the last quarter of the century.
